An Easy Case Makes Bad Law—Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) by Taylor-Manning, Robert
Washington Law Review 
Volume 66 Number 2 
4-1-1991 
An Easy Case Makes Bad Law—Burnham v. Superior Court of 
California, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) 
Robert Taylor-Manning 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Jurisdiction Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert Taylor-Manning, Note, An Easy Case Makes Bad Law—Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 
S. Ct. 2105 (1990), 66 Wash. L. Rev. 623 (1991). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol66/iss2/9 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital Commons. 
For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright @ 1991 by Washington Law Review Association
AN EASY CASE MAKES BAD LAW-Burnham v. Superior Court
of California, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
Abstrac" In Burnham v. Superior Court of California, the United States Supreme Court
considered the continued vitality of transient jurisdiction. Although the Court unani-
mously held that the defendant was subject to state court jurisdiction, it failed to agree on
the issue of transient jurisdiction, issuing three plurality opinions. This Note examines
Burnham and concludes that the Court should invalidate transient jurisdiction as a viola-
tion of due process rights. It proposes that the Court evaluate all state court assertions of
jurisdiction against a minimum contacts standard.
One of the mysteries of contemporary litigation is the failure of
more litigants to resurrect Grace v. MacArthur I as a means of serving
process. In Grace,. the defendant received service of process while air-
borne over Arkansas, thereby falling under the jurisdiction of Arkan-
sas courts.2 This form of jurisdiction, based solely on a defendant's
physical presence, is known as transient, or tag, jurisdiction.3 After
the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Shaffer v. Heitner,4 which
required a relationship between presence and the litigation, some com-
mentators predicted the demise of transient jurisdiction.'
Despite predictions of tag jurisdiction's demise, those plaintiffs in
corporate America who relish the idea of serving process on adversa-
ries who are momentarily airborne as in Grace should take heart. A
four-justice plurality's recent defense of transient jurisdiction in Burn-
ham v. Superior Court of California 6 may provide litigants with the
opportunity to instigate the mischief that transient jurisdiction
provides.7
American jurisdictional theory has several identifiable periods and
landmarks. Early jurisdictional theories were primarily concerned
1. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
2. Id. at 447.
3. R. MARCUS, M. REDISH & E. SHERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE, A MODERN APPROACH 580
(1989).
4. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
5. See Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In Personam
Jurisdiction, 25 VILL. L. REV. 38 (1979); Symposium on Shaffer v. Heitner, 45 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 493 (1979) [hereinafter Symposium].
6. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
7. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 300 (1956).
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with issues of sovereignty.8 Pennoyer v. Neff 9 addressed state sover-
eignty concerns, requiring the physical presence of defendants to sup-
port jurisdiction.'" Pennoyer also introduced the idea that due process
prevents unreasonable exercises of jurisdiction.1 The United States'
subsequent economic and geographic growth prompted the Supreme
Court, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, t2 to establish a "mini-
mum contacts" standard that diminished sovereignty concerns and
recognized jurisdictional factors other than physical presence.13
Nearly thirty years of developing minimum contacts theory led the
Supreme Court to decide in Shaffer v. Heitner 14 that, sovereignty con-
cerns notwithstanding, due process required minimum contacts sup-
porting jurisdiction in quasi in rem actions to encompass the litigation
as well as the defendant and the forum.'" The development of juris-
dictional theory by the Supreme Court since Shaffer has emphasized
that the primary function of jurisdictional rules is the protection of
rights, with state sovereignty a lesser concern.' 6
The tension between a sovereignty-based approach and a rights-
based approach came to a head in Burnham v. Superior Court of Cali-
fornia. '" Justice Scalia, in a plurality opinion that commanded four
votes, argued that the long pedigree of sovereignty-based transient
jurisdiction justified a state court's exercise of jurisdiction based on
physical presence alone.18 Justice Brennan, in a separate four vote
plurality opinion, explicitly extended the holding of Shaffer to in per-
sonam actions, and required the defendant to have minimum contacts
with the forum to support jurisdiction.' 9
8. The English colonies of North America established jurisdictional rules that became
unworkable in the rapidly expanding economy of the American states. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an
Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi In Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 DUKE
L.J. 1147, 1156-59.
9. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer has been almost entirely superceded by later decisions. See
especially the line of cases begining with International Shoe supra notes 44-50.
10. Id. at 726-27.
11. Id. at 733.
12. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
13. Id. at 316.
14. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
15. Id. at 212.
16. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471 (1985); Insurance Corp. of Ir., Ltd.
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n. 10 (1982); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
17. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
18. Id. at 2109-13.
19. Id. at 2121-22.
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I. A CRITICAL HISTORY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Pre-Pennoyer Procedure
Jurisdictional requirements confine the validity of state judicial
action. 0 The first American courts were colonial, small enough to
require only the power of a summons and the threat of social ostra-
cism to compel the appearance of a party.21 As the colonies grew in
population and trade developed between settlements, the problem of
debt collection forced courts to adopt more extreme alternatives to
-summons.22 One alternative permitted plaintiffs to attach defendants'
property in lieu of requiring their physical presence.23 Such writs of
attachment later allowed plaintiffs to liquidate defendants' assets to
satisfy judgments.24 Despite these procedural developments, travel
and communication problems combined with some colonies' reluc-
tance to respect other colonies' judgments to limit creditors' ability to
collect debts."
The United States Constitution provided the next advance in juris-
dictional theory. The full faith and credit clause 6 ameliorated the dif-
ficulties creditors faced in enforcing judgments on debts.27 Despite
this improvement in interstate comity, increasingly mobile defendants
made transient jurisdiction difficult to obtain, and quasi in rem reme-
dies limited the recovery of plaintiff creditors.2 8
Large scale transportation and financial companies and the
increased role of corporations in the economy brought new challenges
to courts that relied on physical presence for obtaining jurisdiction. 9
State courts responded with legal fictions such as "consent" and
"implied consent" to bind corporations to state court judgments.3 °
The pace and scope of industrial, manufacturing, and business growth
outstripped these fictions as the interstate commerce clause,' and
20. Judgments made by a court that does not have jurisdiction are unenforceable. Id. at 2109;
see also J. VANCE, JURISDICTION; ITS EXERCISE IN COMMENCING AN ACTION AT LAW 15
(1890).
21. Kalo, supra note 8, at- 1152-56.
22. See id. at 1156-59.
23. See id. at 1158-59.
24. See id. at 1158-62.
25. See id. at 1162.
26. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
27. Kalo, supra note 8, at 1160-62.
28. Id. at 1162.
29. See id. at 1162-82.
30. Seeid. at 1166-76.
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United States Supreme Court rulings that corporations were 'per-
sons,' 3 1 stifled state efforts to control corporate activities.32
A much needed clarification and systemization of American law
provided the major theoretical advance of the early nineteenth cen-
tury, setting the stage for Pennoyer.33 Justice Joseph Story's Commen-
taries on the Conflict of Laws,34 published in 1834, became an often
consulted authority for the courts of the era.3 Justice Story's jurisdic-
tional theories were especially persuasive, serving as the basis of sev-
eral state court rulings and providing the theoretical framework for
Pennoyer.36 Commentators, however, have criticized Justice Story's
jurisdictional framework for confusing the principles on which it was
based.37
B. A Two-Sided Coin: Pennoyer v. Neff
Pennoyer3' begins most modem jurisdictional studies because it
presents the jurisdictional forms used in this country39 and links juris-
dictional issues to constitutional rights through the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause." In Pennoyer, the Court held that service
of process by publication on a physically absent defendant did not con-
fer jurisdiction on a state court.41 The Court incorporated two impor-
31. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889), noted in Kalo, supra note 8,
at 1178 n.204.
32. See Kalo, supra note 8, at 1178-82.
33. R. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD
REPUBLIC 272 (1985).
34. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 29, 532-541 (7th ed. 1872).
Citations to Story are from the seventh edition to conform with Justice Scalia's use of that
volume.
35. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (1990). Justice Story
based his ideas concerning transient jurisdiction on those of the Dutch jurist Ultricus Huberus.
Huberus' propositions gave each state's laws effect within its boundaries and made each citizen of
the state subject to its laws. Justice Story conflated these principles into the idea that state courts
have jurisdiction over all persons within state boundaries. See Hazard, A General Theory of
State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241, 259-60.
36. Justice Scalia refers to Justice Story's influence on state courts. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at
2111.
37. Hazard, supra note 35, at 259-60.
38. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
39. Id. at 724 (quoting Boswell v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336 (1850)). In personam
jurisdiction involves a person's acts or status. In rem jurisdiction involves the status of property.
Quasi in rem jurisdiction allows parties to affect the rights of others by moving against their
property located within a state. R. MARCUS, M. REDISH & E. SHERMAN, supra note 3, at
579-82.
40. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
41. Id. at 734. The facts of Pennoyer are thoroughly discussed in Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and
Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV.
479 (1987).
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tant concepts in reaching this conclusion. First, it explicitly
incorporated into American common law Justice Story's notion that
state courts have jurisdiction over all persons physically present in the
state.' Second, the Court construed the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause to require physical presence for state court jurisdic-
tion.43 Because Pennoyer incorporated competing values of state sov-
ereignty and constitutional due process, it was amenable to
modification in later cases such as International Shoe.
C. Modern Jurisdiction: International Shoe Co. v. Washington
As American society became more mobile and commerce devel-
oped, states created legal fictions to maintain their ability to reach
defendants.' In 1945, the Supreme Court replaced these legal fictions
with a real framework. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,45 a
corporation questioned the legitimacy of Washington State's attempt
to tax it.4 6 The corporation argued that Washington lacked jurisdic-
tion over it because it was not "present" within the state.47 The
Supreme Court rejected this argument,4 reasoning that presence was
not the only basis on which a party might be subject to jurisdiction,
and that the corporation had incurred certain obligations, such as the
payment of taxes, by doing business in Washington.49 The Court held
the corporation's minimum contacts with the state sufficient to justify
state court jurisdiction."0
42. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722-23. The transmission of ideas, from Huberus to Story to the
Pennoyer Court, is detailed in Hazard, supra note 35, at 258-60. Although the cases that Story
discussed were English and American, his overarching theories were those of scholars from
Belgium, The Netherlands, France and Italy, whose legal systems were different from England's.
R. NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 297.
43. This constitutional limitation on state court jurisdiction is grounded in "the protection
and enforcement of private rights." Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. Previously, states had broader
latitude in their jurisdictional policies. See, eg., Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308,
316-20 (1870).
44. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (non-resident motorists using state roads
implicitly consent to service); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882) (state may designate agent for
service of process on foreign corporation). See generally Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe:
Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of Presence-Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 565,
578 (1979).
45. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
46. Id. at 312-14.
47. Id. at 315-16. The corporation argued that it lacked the traditional indicia of presence,
such as maintaining offices, inventory or facilities within the state.
48. Id at 315-17.
49. Id. at 319.
50. IJd at 320; see Kalo, supra note 8, at 1176-83.
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Numerous cases have refined, rejected, or restated the minimum
contacts that courts may count or weigh in their jurisdictional analy-
sis.51 This shift from "presence" to "contacts" recognizes the
predominantly national, as opposed to state, character of personal and
business relations in the twentieth century.5
D. A Single Standard: Shaffer v. Heitner
As International Shoe refigured the basis of in personam jurisdic-
tion, so Shaffer v. Heitner53 changed the basis of quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion.54 Developed to protect creditors from increasingly mobile
debtors,55 quasi in rem jurisdiction permitted plaintiffs to attach
defendants' intangible property,56 such as debt5 7 and insurance poli-
cies.5 This procedure reached its terminus in Shaffer v. Heitner, when
the Supreme Court rejected this approach and concluded that courts
must evaluate "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction" according to
the standards developed in International Shoe. 9
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have suggested that due pro-
cess has displaced sovereignty as the sole focus of jurisdictional
51. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (contacts
with forum that were not continuous or systematic did not support general jurisdiction over
litigation unrelated to contacts); Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84 (1978)
(contacts with a forum state must be purposeful to support jurisdiction); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958) (minimal, non-purposeful contact with forum will not support jurisdiction);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (a single contact with the forum is
sufficient to support jurisdiction if it is also the focus of the litigation); Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (systematic and continuous corporate contacts provide general
jurisdiction for state courts); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (a corporation placing products in the stream of commerce is subject
to jurisdiction); see also Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of
Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 697-705 (1987).
52. Kogan, A Neo-federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 343-58
(1990).
53. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
54. Quasi in rem jurisdiction either sequesters defendant's property to compel a personal
appearance or attaches defendant's property to permit the court to satisfy plaintiff's claim at a
judicial auction. D. CRUMP, W. DORSANEO, 0. CHASE & R. PERSCHBACHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 101 (1987); see also H. SCHACK, JURISDICTIONAL MINIMUM
CONTACTS SCRUTINIZED 54-55 (1983).
55. See Kalo, supra note 8, at 1158-61.
56. In Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905), the Court permitted the sequestration of
intangible property. See also Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank of Cinncinati, 243 U.S. 269,
271-72 (1917).
57. Harris, 198 U.S. at 222.
58. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). But see Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
59. 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977). The Court overruled Pennoyer and Harris to the extent that
they were inconsistent with Shaffer. Id. at 212 n.39.
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inquiry. In World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 6I the Supreme
Court suggested that sovereignty concerns be balanced against due
process considerations.61 World- Wide abandoned Pennoyer's state ter-
ritoriality principle. It endorsed a federal system,6" in which the due
process clause was characterized as an "instrument of interstate feder-
alism."63 Two years later, in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 4 the Court explained that restrictions on state
sovereign power are "a function of the individual liberty interest pre-
served by the Due Process Clause."6
With the rationale and continued applicability of the transient juris-
diction doctrine in doubt after Shaffer, lower courts felt obliged to
wrestle with the issue. 6 Some courts read the holding of Shaffer nar-
rowly and declined to extend its reasoning to in personam actions
without clear direction from the Court. 7 Other courts provided their
own interpretations of Shaffer, concluding that its logic, if not its hold-
ing, applied to in personam actions as well as to quasi in rem actions.68
E. Burnham v. Superior Court of California
The growing split on the role of transient jurisdiction and the cor-
rect scope of the Supreme Court's holding in Shaffer came to a head in
Burnham v. Superior Court of California.69 Although the Court
reached a unanimous result, it failed to resolve the underlying histori-
cal, legal and equitable issues involved. Justice Scalia announced the
60. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
61. Id. at 291-92.
62. Id. at 293 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
63. Id. at 294.
64. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
65. Id. at 702 n.10. That "[tihe Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest"
was restated in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471 (1985). Other language in
Burger King concerning physical presence is more ambiguous. Id. at 476. The Bauxites analysis
is criticized by Stein, supra note 51, at 711-14.
66. Justice Scalia refers to these cases in Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct.
2105, 2113 (1990).
67. Nutri-West, Inc. v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 693, 696 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting Opert v. Schmidt,
535 F. Supp. 591, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
68. Duehring v. Vasquez, 490 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 1986). In an action seeking increased
child support payments, the Louisiana court of appeals determined that physical presence alone
does not justify jurisdiction; due process required the defendant to have minimum contacts with
the state. The court held that Vasquez's "repeated and purposeful" presence in the state to visit
the child, rather than his physical presence, supported jurisdiction. Id. at 673; see also Nehemiah
v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1985); Harold M. Pitman Co. v.
Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
448 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979);
Bershaw v. Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653, 700 P.2d 347 (1985).
69. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
629
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opinion of the Court, which commanded only four votes total. Justice
Brennan issued a concurring opinion which also commanded four
votes. Justice Stevens issued a one paragraph opinion distancing him-
self from both pluralities. Justice White, in addition to joining most of
Justice Scalia's opinion, also issued a brief concurrence.
Dennis and Francie Burnham were married in 1976 in West Vir-
ginia." They later moved to New Jersey where their two children
were born.7 1 In 1987, the Burnhams separated and agreed that Mrs.
Burnham would move to California and retain custody of the chil-
dren. 72 The parties also agreed that Mrs. Burnham would file for
divorce in New Jersey on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.73
Despite this agreement, Mr. Burnham filed for divorce in New Jersey
on the grounds of desertion soon after his wife and children moved to
California. 74 He did not serve his wife with process and Mrs. Burn-
ham subsequently filed for divorce in California. 7' Later that month,
Mr. Burnham travelled to California for three days, first conducting
business in the southern part of the state, and then visiting his chil-
dren.7 6 While returning one of his children to the mother's home, Mr.
Burnham received service of divorce papers.7 7 After returning to New
Jersey, Mr. Burnham entered a special appearance in California to
contest the superior court's assertion of personal jurisdiction.7 ' The
court rejected the motion and the California court of appeals denied
mandamus relief.79 The United States Supreme Court unanimously
upheld the California court's exercise of jurisdiction. 0
Despite the unanimity of the result, the Supreme Court did not
resolve the issues involved. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Rehn-
quist, White, and Kennedy, concluded that transient jurisdiction has
always been valid and that states may continue to base jurisdiction on
physical presence alone.8" He rejected Mr. Burnham's argument that,
post-Shaffer, all assertions of jurisdiction must comport with the mini-
70. Id. at 2109.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2119, 2120, 2126.
81. Id. at 2110-13.
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mum contacts test of International Shoe, 2 and limited the holding in
Shaffer to quasi in rem matters.8 3
Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor and Marshall, offered a sharply divergent analysis.8 4 He
disagreed with Justice Scalia's contention that history decided the
validity of transient jurisdiction and argued for the due process analy-
sis that marked International Shoe and Shaffer. 5 He explained that
the contemporary notions of due process developed in International
Shoe and Shaffer invalidated physical presence as a sufficient basis on
which to justify jurisdiction. 6 Noting the benefits Mr. Burnham
received while in California, such as police and fire protection, Justice
Brennan determined Mr. Burnham's contacts with California were
sufficient to uphold jurisdiction. 7 The split in the Court's opinions
reduced Burnham's precedential value, 8 and could have been avoided
had the Court followed its recent decisions.
II. THE PRIMACY OF RIGHTS OVER SOVEREIGNTY
Burnham reflected the Supreme Court's inability to forge a consen-
sus on the broad issues of theory, policy and law that underlie personal
jurisdiction. 9 Justice Scalia emphasized state sovereignty concerns
and relied on the common law to analyze transient jurisdiction. 0 In
contrast, Justice Brennan valued due process and defended the mod-
82. Id at 2115-17.
83. Id
84. Id. at 2120-26.
85. Id. at 2120-22.
86. Id. at 2122-26.
87. Id. at 2124-25.
88. Justice Stevens offers a single paragraph concurrence in which he refers to all three
written opinions approvingly, but adopts none of them. Id. at 2126. The precedential value of
Burnham is unclear. Smith v. Smith, 459 N.W.2d 785, 788 n.3 (N.D. 1990); MBM Fisheries,
Inc. v. Bollinger Mach. Shop & Shipyard, Inc., 60 Wash. App. 414, 421 n.3, 804 P.2d 627, 631
n.3 (1991). Where the Court agrees on a result without any majority of the Court agreeing on
the questions of law involved, lower courts have no authority to follow. See United States v.
Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1221, 1225 (6th Cir. 1983) (plurality opinion has "little binding precedent");
United States v. Friedman, 528 F.2d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 1976) ("[a] mere plurality
pronouncement of this type does not have the binding effect" of a majority decision). In cases
such as Burnham, where there are two equally divided but mutually exclusive rationales, there is
no narrow area of agreement from which to extract a holding. See Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.).
89. See generally Kogan, supra note 52, at 359.
90. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2110-17. Because it is not possible to discern a majority or
minority opinion in this decision, Justice Scalia's name is used to represent the opinion issued by
himself and those justices joining him. Justice Brennan's name is used in the same manner and
for the same purpose.
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ern minimum contacts approach. 91 Justice Brennan's approach was
more consistent with the Court's decisions of the last decade, but his
minimum contacts analysis was so broad that persons transitorily
present cannot help but have minimum contacts sufficient to support
jurisdiction. Such a broad definition is little better than the bright line
rule of transient jurisdiction. Justice Brennan should have applied
minimum contacts as that test is applied to corporations to determine
if those contacts served as a logical or equitable basis for jurisdiction.
A. State Sovereignty and a Court Divided
Justice Scalia's opinion assumed that limits on the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction are fundamentally territorial in nature.92 This
reflected his conviction that states' borders define the limits of their
authority.9 3 As a result, Justice Scalia examined state court practices
to determine if a particular type of jurisdictional practice, such as tran-
sient jurisdiction, is valid.94 This approach misread the Court's prior
personal jurisdiction decisions, and failed to recognize the primacy of
due process over sovereignty concerns.
1. Sovereignty Concerns Yielded to Fairness at the Common Law
Justice Scalia contended that physical presence alone was the gold
standard of jurisdiction at common law, and that this jurisdictional
standard came to America as part of English common law.95 This
contention reflected an incomplete reading of English common law
concerning transient jurisdiction. English courts placed the protection
of liberty before territorial authority, and only occasionally recognized
actions against persons transitorily present.96 Leading scholars chal-
lenged the historical status and acceptance of transient jurisdiction in
England.97 Justice Scalia argued that long before Pennoyer, most nine-
teenth century American courts based jurisdiction on in-state service
91. Id. at 2120-22.
92. Id. at 2115.
93. Id. at 2110.
94. Id. at 2110, 2116-17.
95. Id. at 2110-11.
96. Justice Scalia acknowledged that English courts only "sometimes" allowed the actions.
Id. at 2110. One commentator concluded that "English courts have always felt free to protect a
foreign defendant against 'oppression and injustice' by refusing to assert a mere transient
jurisdiction." Ehrenzweig, supra note 7, at 300.
97. Ehrenzweig, supra note 7, at 298-303. English jurisdictional theory emphasized the
concept of franchise far more than it did territory. Hazard, supra note 35, at 253; see also R.
LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW, § 25 n.13 and
accompanying text (4th ed. 1986); Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the
European Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1197 (1984).
632
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of process.98 This may be true, but it does not reflect a reliance on
practices drawn from English courts, which allowed service of process
abroad as early as 1781.11
2. Pennoyer Subordinated State Court Practices to Federal
Standards
Justice Scalia argued that the widespread acceptance of Justice
Story's Commentaries by state courts and in Pennoyer supported the
idea that state courts' authority is limited only by their borders."°
This argument oversimplified Pennoyer. It ignored the fact that Pen-
noyer's primary effect was to limit state court authority. Prior to Pen-
noyer, the full faith and credit clause merely permitted states to reject
a foreign state court's judgment if the foreign state court failed to com-
ply with its own internal jurisdictional practices. 101 Pennoyer stood
for the entirely separate idea that a state court judgment was invalid
within its own borders if the state's jurisdictional practices did not
comport with federal due process.10 2 Justice Scalia argued that the
incorporation of the due process requirement of the fourteenth amend-
ment in Pennoyer was only dictum.10 3 This interpretation may be cor-
rect, and certain commentators agree with Justice Scalia's
conclusion."° Nonetheless, Pennoyer's dictum has had a powerful
effect on modem conceptions of the permissible jurisdictional
forms.' 0 Moreover, Justice Scalia's recognition of the extent to which
the technological and commercial changes of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries required a weakening of Pennoyer's rule
undermined his conclusion relegating due process concerns to mere
dictum.'0 6 Pennoyer's essence is not the confirmation of a state court's
authority within state boundaries, but the requirement of federal
approval of that exercise of authority.
98. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2110-12.
99. Ehrenzweig, supra note 7, at 299.
100. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2111; see also J. STORY, supra note 34, at §§ 19, 22, 539.
101. One example of such a discussion can be found in Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 226-28
(1905).
102. See supra note 43.
103. Burnham, I10 S. Ct. at 2113.
104. See, eg., Perdue, supra note 41, at 499-500.
105. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2114. One measure of Pennoyer's continuing strength is found in
the service of subpoenas. See Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer's Last Vestige, 74
MINN. L. REv. 37 (1989).
106. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2114.
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3. Lower Courts Have Removed Their Sovereign Crowns
Justice Scalia argued that lower courts continue to accept physical
presence as the sole basis of jurisdiction.10 7 He excepted from his
argument five lower court decisions rejecting transient jurisdiction."'
He construed these cases as having misread the scope of the Court's
earlier due process decisions, especially the holding in Shaffer. 1o This
interpretation reflects only a cursory reading of the lower courts' deci-
sions. Two of those decisions carefully noted that Shaffer only applied
to quasi in rem assertions of jurisdiction, yet still found Shaffer's mode
of analysis applicable to in personam assertions of jurisdiction."1 0 Of
the three remaining decisions, two reflect a broad reading of Shaffer
supplemented by scholarly authority, public policy and logic. 1II Jus-
tice Scalia claimed that no decision based on state law rejects transient
jurisdiction. 12 This claim was true, but only to the extent that tran-
sient jurisdiction's rejection was based on logic, public policy, scholar-
ship and federal case authority rather than state law.
13
B. Due Process Is the Proper Focus of Personal Jurisdiction Issues
1. The Court's Jurisdiction Decisions Have Always Incorporated
Due Process
The Supreme Court retains the authority to examine state court
practices for compliance with due process, even those employed for
over a century." 4 As Justice Brennan's opinion recognized, all state
court jurisdictional practices must comport with due process. "5 The
Court has relied on due process considerations in deciding a wide vari-
ety of jurisdictional issues.' 1 6 Sometimes, as in Pennoyer and Shaffer,
107. Id. at 2113.
108. Id. These cases are listed supra note 67.
109. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2113.
110. Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 46-47 (3d Cir. 1985);
Duehring v. Vasquez, 490 So. 2d 667, 670-71 (La. App. 1986).
111. Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305, 312-13 (N.D. Ill.
1986); Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979). Only Bershaw v. Sarbacher failed to analyse Shaffer and
its rationale. 40 Wash. App. 653, 657, 700 P.2d 347, 349 (1985).
112. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2113.
113. See Schreiber, 448 F. Supp. at 1089; Pitman, 626 F. Supp. at 313.
114. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2121. Justice White made the same point in his concurrence. Id.
at 2119 (White, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 2120.
116. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (cases determining which facts constituted
minimum contacts and therefore satisfied due process).
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the Court invalidated state court practices.117 Other decisions, such as
International Shoe, granted the Court's sanction to new procedures.11 8
A number of the Court's decisions determined the quality of the mini-
mum contacts that were necessary to support jurisdiction.119 The
common concerns in these different contexts were fairness and due
process protection. These cases exemplify the Court's protection of
non-residents' due process rights.12
2. The Basis of Review: Fairness
Justice Scalia's defense of transient jurisdiction was based on scores
of state court decisions.121 Many of these cases were decided before
International Shoe, and had no theory with which to replace territorial
sovereignty. Justice Brennan criticized Justice Scalia for leaving the
protection of constitutional rights to the states because states have lit-
tle incentive to protect the constitutional rights of non-residents. 122
Inexplicably, Justice Brennan failed to cite Court decisions of the last
decade that magnified the importance of the individual constitutional
interest in due process and correspondingly diminished the importance
of state sovereignty concerns. 123
3. What Process is Due? Analogy and Method
This skirmishing about the basis of review eventually subsided to
reveal the ultimate issue: what process is due? Justice Scalia made
several arguments concerning the process that is due, but many of
these arguments ignored the Court's unique role in protecting consti-
tutional rights. Justice Scalia first argued that transient jurisdiction
does not need to satisfy due process standards because its use predates
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment.124 This argument ignored
the Court's frequent rejection of state court jurisdictional practices
that were in use before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment,
Pennoyer and Shaffer being two examples. As Justice Brennan
117. See supra notes 38-43, 59 and accompanying text (discussing Pennoyer and Shaffer,
respectively).
118. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
120. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2125 n.12 (1990).
121. Id at 2110-13. The federal government imposes many restrictions other than due
process on state court jurisdiction. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 4.31 (2d ed. 1980).
122. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2125 n.14.
123. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
124. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2113-15.
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explained in connection with Shaffer, the demands of due process ulti-
mately triumph over historical pedigree. 25
Justice Scalia then contended that the standard of "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice" announced in International
Shoe is an analogy modeled on physical presence. 2 6 If Justice Scalia
were correct, assertions of jurisdiction based on physical presence
might be exempt from the standards applied to contacts-based juris-
diction. A close reading of International Shoe reveals no intent by the
Court to model minimum contacts after physical presence. 127 Justice
Scalia did not indicate where or how International Shoe based its due
process standard on presence. 128  That litigants' physical presence
within a state prevents them from receiving due process is neither logi-
cal nor fair. 2 1
Justice Scalia's next distinction was that novel jurisdictional proce-
dures must meet higher standards of justification than established pro-
cedures.t 30 This test required the procedure in question to "show the
sanction of settled usage in both England and in this country."'
131
Such a standard would prohibit the use of long arm jurisdiction, which
meets neither test. 132 In fact, as Justice Brennan pointed out in his
opinion, transient jurisdiction itself does not meet the standard Justice
Scalia sets.'
33
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that transient jurisdiction does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice because
state courts define what those traditional notions are.' 34 For Justice
125. Id. at 2120-21.
126. Id. at 2115.
127. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-19 (1945). If Justice
Scalia's interpretation were correct, any contact by a corporation, no matter how brief or fleeting,
would suffice to support state court jurisdiction. On the contrary, due process is satisfied only if
the "quality and nature" of the corporate contacts make it fair to bind a party. Id. at 319. Under
this test, the Court should examine the quality and nature of individuals' physical presence when
examining jurisdictional questions. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing criteria
for minimum contacts).
128. Justice Scalia provides neither a page citation nor a quotation to relevant language to
support this assertion. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
129. "The decision of each litigant to locate himself in one state cannot be viewed as
somehow guarded by the sovereign borders of that state and outside of the realm of the federal
Constitution's control." Kogan, supra note 52, at 353.
130. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2116. But see Leflar, The Converging Limits of State
Jurisdictional Powers, 9 J. PUB. L. 282, 291-92 (1960) (tradition and history shape, but do not
define, fair play and substantial justice).
131. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884)).
132. Long arm jurisdiction permits service of process on parties not physically present in the
forum. See supra notes 44, 51 and accompanying text.
133. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2122-24; see supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
134. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119.
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Scalia the test of an ancient jurisdictional form's validity was its con-
tinued use by state courts.135 As Justice Brennan responded, states
have little incentive to protect the rights of non-citizens involved in
litigation with residents.136 Further, the Court does not defer to state
practice in jurisdictional disputes. Pennoyer and Shaffer rejected state
court practices because they violated due process rights. 13 7  When
state courts decide jurisdictional questions they perform federal func-
tions related not to the interest of the citizens of that state, but to the
interests all states and citizens have in the fair and efficient administra-
tion of justice.131
4. Shaffer and Due Process
Mr. Burnham's most compelling argument against transient juris-
diction was that, since Shaffer, all assertions of state court jurisdiction,
including actions in personam, must comport with the standards set in
International Shoe. 139  This argument presented two separate ques-
tions: first, the proper scope of Shaffer, and, second, the applicability
of the Shaffer analysis to in personam actions.
Lower courts and commentators have questioned the scope of Shaf-
fer's holding since that case was decided.1" In Burnham, Justice
Scalia took the position that Shaffer only affected quasi in rem asser-
tions of jurisdiction.14" ' He attempted to distinguish Shaffer from
Burnham on the grounds that Shaffer involved defendants who were
not physically present. 42 The Delaware court asserted jurisdiction
over defendants in Shaffer because they owned property in the
forum. 4 3 Justice Scalia assumed that the presence of a body is more
meaningful than the presence of stock certificates, but failed to develop
this assumption. 44 The Supreme Court held in Shaffer that presence
135. Id. at 2117.
136. Id. at 2125 n.14.
137. See supra notes 43, 59 and accompanying text.
138. Kogan, supra note 52, at 357-58.
139. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115 (making reference to Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977)).
140. Contrast those cases adopting a narrow reading of Shaffer, such as Burnham, 110 S. Ct.
at 2113, with others that read Shaffer broadly, see supra notes 68, 108-11 and accompanying
text.
141. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115-16.
142. Id. at 2115.
143. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 191-94.
144. Kogan argues that the original decision in Pennoyer was heavily influenced by John
Locke's theory that one's body was a form of property, and that all other property rights grew
out of one's right to property in one's self. He distinguishes this notion from the more modem,
post-Hohfeldian notion that all property rights are a manifestation of personal rights. Kogan,
supra note 52, at 337-44.
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alone was insufficient to support jurisdiction.' 45 Whether that pres-
ence is property owned by a defendant or the defendant's body should
not matter. Logic supports this interpretation: if the physical presence
of property is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction, the physical pres-
ence of a body, without more, should be equally insufficient. 146 Justice
Brennan explained that Shaffer made minimum contacts the measure
of all assertions of jurisdiction.147 Justice Brennan also offered the
widespread acceptance of the broad reading of Shaffer by the aca-
demic community as support for its adoption."4
III. APPLICATION OF STANDARDS: THE ROAD NOT
TAKEN
If transient jurisdiction is abolished, courts will need to perform a
minimum contacts analysis to determine whether jurisdiction is justi-
fied. Justice Scalia contended that such analysis is inherently subjec-
tive and thus inadequate. 4 9 Justice Brennan pointed to the success
courts have had in applying minimum contacts analysis to corpora-
tions as evidence of their competence to apply this standard to individ-
ual defendants.' 5 ° Justice Brennan recognized that most situations
involving individuals' physical presence also involve intentional, pur-
poseful or knowing risk that their presence makes them subject to
state court jurisdiction. '
As Justice Scalia pointed out, however, Justice Brennan's applica-
tion of minimum contacts was too broad.' 52 Too broad an application
reproduces the effects of transient jurisdiction under a different
name."' Justice Brennan made this critique possible because he
emphasized the potential benefits a person might receive while in-state
and ignored those benefits actually enjoyed by the person. 54 Such
145. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211-12.
146. See Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 47 (3d Cir. 1985);
Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305, 313 (N.D. II1. 1986).
147. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (1990).
148. Id. at 2121-22.
149. Id. at 2117. Justice Scalia did not explain how minimum contacts analysis involving an
individual is more subjective than that same analysis applied to a corporation.
150. Id. at 2122 n.7.
151. Id. at 2124-25. Physical presence was not a litmus test of jurisdiction for Justice
Brennan but merely a compelling type of contact that has historically sufficed to subject persons
to a court's jurisdiction. Id. at 2124.
152. Id. at 2117.
153. Id.
154. Id. Justice Brennan labeled the use of highways and police and fire protection as the
benefits that Mr. Burnham received, but ignored the familial benefits he enjoyed.
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analysis makes it nearly impossible for a person transitorily present to
escape jurisdiction.'
If the goal of the Court is to apply a single jurisdictional standard"5 6
that protects due process rights, it should apply minimum contacts
analysis to individuals in the same manner as it is applied to corpora-
tions. Such a test would regard an individual's physical presence in
the same manner that a corporate agent's presence is treated. 5 7 As
with corporations, an individual's minimum contacts with a forum
would support jurisdiction over litigation related to those contacts.158
This specific jurisdiction would encompass the facts of Burnham, as
Mr. Bumham's presence in the forum was related to the underlying
litigation.5 9  Specific jurisdiction, unlike transient jurisdiction, pre-
serves the distinction between minimum contacts and minimal con-
tacts."6 The defendant in Grace v. MacArthur exemplified the
individual whose minimal contacts should not support jurisdiction.'
The real test of this theory comes from Justice Scalia's hypothetical
challenges to Justice Brennan." 2 Justice Scalia's first challenge to this
standard was length of contact: what if Mr. Burnham had visited for
fifteen minutes rather that three days? 63 Such a visit is likely to be a
brief pause in a larger journey such as an airport layover. Unless the
layover is related to the litigation, the presence would be attenuated
and should not support jurisdiction. For example, if Mr. Burnham
155. As Justice Scalia suggested, the only transient able to escape jurisdiction is one who
travels by foot, in poverty, for no particular purpose in a state that does not permit a forum non
conveniens transfer. Id. at 2118.
156. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
157. R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 97, at § 36.
158. Id. at §§ 21-22.
159. This is the analysis applied by the Louisiana court of appeals in Duehring v. Vasquez,
490 So. 2d 667, 673-74 (La. App. 1986). See supra note 67. The Louisiana appeals court
determined that Vasquez's presence was purposeful and related to the underlying litigation. Mr.
Burnham's trip to California to visit his children was also purposeful and related to the subject
matter of the suit, the custody and support of the children. Like Vasquez, Mr. Burnham reached
out to create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state. See also
Travelers Health Ass'n. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950) (businesses that reach out to create
continuing relationships with citizens of another state are subject to jurisdiction in that state).
160. Minimal contacts have generally not supported jurisdiction over corporations. See
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1945). See generally supra note 51;
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
161. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959); see supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
162. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2118 (1990).
163. Id.
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frequently arranged his itinerary 64 to visit his children at California
airports during layovers, his presence would be purposeful. If, how-
ever, regular travel plans placed him there briefly on one occasion, the
fact that his plane landed in the state instead of flying over the state
should not increase Mr. Burnham's succeptibility to jurisdiction.
Another challenge to the standard was purpose: what if Mr. Burn-
ham had not gone to northern California to see his children, but had
remained in the southern part of the state to do business?' 65 If busi-
ness conduct occurred frequently it might confer general jurisdiction
over a party.1 66 If, however, a person travelled through the remote
northeast part of California while travelling from Nevada to Oregon,
her presence on the roads would be as transient and attenuated as a
passenger in a small aircraft flying over the same route. Hypothetical
fact patterns present challenges to any system, but the Court has
proven its ability to apply standards to meet the needs of jurisdiction
cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even before its decision in Burnham, the Supreme Court encoun-
tered difficulty in reconciling the twin demands of interstate sover-
eignty and constitutional liberty protections.1 67  The split in lower
courts and of the Supreme Court itself, however, demands reconcilia-
tion. Justice Scalia's analysis cannot be reconciled with due process
concerns or personal jurisdiction developments since International
Shoe. Justice Brennan presented an analysis more consistent with
Supreme Court decisions since International Shoe. Transient jurisdic-
tion should be abandoned and minimum contacts should be applied to
individuals in the same manner it is applied to corporations as the
standard for all state court jurisdictional assertions. With Justice
Brennan's retirement, the outcome of the next transient jurisdiction
case before the Supreme Court is less than certain. The only certainty
164. The facts of this case suggest this may be true. See Brief on the Merits for the Real Party
in Interest at 5-6, 19-20, 28-33; Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2-3,
Burnham (No. 89-44).
165. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2118.
166. In fact, Mr. Burnham engaged in business in California on an annual basis and received
tax benefits from these trips. Brief on the Merits for the Real Party in Interest, supra note 164, at
28-33.
167. Kogan noted prior to the decision in Burnham that "[t]he Supreme Court straddles the
fence, unable to commit itself ... [and] unsuccessful in its struggle to reconcile the relationship
between these values." Kogan, supra note 52, at 359.
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is that, given the confusion created by Burnham, the issue will soon
arise again.
Robert Taylor-Manning
